Compendium Of Canada`s Engagement In International Environmental Agreements

This review will focus on whether auditing is an issue that deserves more social concern and research. Our approach is organized around four minor questions. First, based on existing international environmental regimes, how is verification carried out and what are the relevant approaches? Secondly, how is the verification carried out in accordance with national environmental legislation? National experience is important, as there are in-depth studies on how compliance with pollution legislation is monitored on the national territory and by the fact that international agreements are usually implemented by national institutions. Third, can important social science perspectives explain the demand and character of verification observed in existing regimes? And do these perspectives explain the differences between arms control verification and environmental assessment? Fourth, what do the answers to these questions suggest for future regimes, such as. B the control of global climate change, the preservation of biodiversity and the limitation of deforestation? The measurability of responses to these problems is sometimes a problem; Although most international environmental agreements do not require formal monitoring of the implementation of the measures requested on the national territory, the parties are often required to report themselves on the implementation process. The problem arises at regular meetings of the parties, usually in the context of discussions on compliance. It is rarely a question of checking whether the agreement has been implemented or not, but rather whether its implementation has been sufficient. LESSONS FROM PRACTICE AND THEORY First, verification can become an exceptional dimension of international cooperation, so much so that agreements that cannot be properly verified are not politically feasible. It is obvious that much depends on the definition of “appropriate”. The concern about non-compliance with the Soviet Union was such within the US administration that, since 1984, at the request of Congress, the President of the United States has reported annually, at the request of Congress, on the status of the Soviet Union`s compliance with arms control agreements (110).

These proposals have been the subject of an in-depth review for arms control (e.g. B ref. 14-16), but less for other issues, including the protection and management of the natural environment. This document is an overview of the functions, concepts and theories related to the review of international environmental agreements. Other useful verifications given to us include Fischer`s study on the verification provisions contained in 13 international environmental agreements, in particular with regard to an agreement on global warming (17, 18) and the assessment of reporting and monitoring by the US General Accounting Offices (GAO) under 8 major international environmental agreements (19). Finally, the national report on implementation information is the norm (17, 19) in cases where such data are needed. . . .



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